This paper uses a gravity model to assess ex-post regional trade agreements. The model includes 130 countries and is estimated with panel data over the period . The introduction of the correct number of dummy variables allows for identification of Vinerian trade creation and trade diversion effects, while the estimation method takes into account a potential correlation between some of the explanatory variables and the bilateral specific effects introduced in the model, as well as a potential selection bias. In contrast to previous estimates in cross-section, results show that regional agreements have generated a significant increase in trade between members, often at the expense of the rest of the world.
INTRODUCTION
After a long period of neglect from the late sixties (Poyhonen, 1963 , Tinbergen, 1962 , Linnemann, 1966 to the late eighties, the gravity trade model has acquired a second youth. First, new theoretical foundations have been proposed both with the advent of trade theories based on increasing returns to scale, in imperfectly competitive markets and firm-level product differentiation (Helpman and Krugman, 1985 , Bergstrand 1985 , 1989 , Baier and Bergstrand, 2001 or Evenett and Keller, 2002 and, within a perfect competition setting, with product differentiation at the national level (Deardorff, 1998 or Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) . Second, the gravity model has been used extensively to study trade patterns, as for example in the case of the drastic changes following the demise of central planning. Most recently, in the estimation of models of geography and trade, the gravity model is, once again, holding center stage (Hummels, 1999 , Redding and Venables, 2001 , Limao and Venables, 2001 ). In fact, the gravity model has also become a favored tool to assess the ex-post trade effects of a currency union (Glick and Rose, 2002 or Rose and Van Wincoop, 2001 ), or the trade creating (TC) and trade diverting (TD) effects associated with preferential trading arrangements (Frankel, 1997 or Soloaga and Winters, 2001 ).
However, for reasons elaborated in this paper, previous estimates of TD and TC are likely to be unreliable.
Along with this renewal in interest, questions have been raised about the proper formulation of the model (choice of variables) as well as about proper econometric techniques, especially when the usual cross-country formulation is amended to include a temporal dimension. Indeed, the discussion about the proper econometric specification of the gravity model has shown that the conventional cross-section formulation without the inclusion of country specific effects is misspecified and so introduces a bias in the assessment of the effects of regional trading agreements (RTAs) on bilateral trade (e.g., Matyas, 1997, Soloaga and Winters, 2001 ). However, it turns out that this panel specification, with three specific effects (exporter, importer and time effects) is only a restricted version of a more general model which allows for country pair heterogeneity (e.g., Cheng and Wall, 1999 or Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2000) .
In contrast to the traditional cross-section gravity model which includes time invariant trade impediment measures (e.g. distance, common language dummies, border, historical and cultural links as in most studies, see Frankel, 1997) , this general proposed specification is more adequate since it accounts for any time invariant (unobserved) bilateral effect. Hence, all factors that influence bilateral trade which were partially captured by regional dummies are now controlled for.
In this paper, I apply this more general panel specification on a recent gravity model specification derived by Baier and Bergstrand (2002) with the addition of: (i) a barrier-to-trade function similar to Limao and Venables (2001) instead of the traditional distance variable and common border dummy, and: (ii) three dummy variables for each RTA considered (intra-trade, imports and exports dummies) to allow for a correct identification of Vinerian trade effects. I show that the predictions of the effects of RTAs in terms of trade creation and trade diversion are very different whether one uses a cross-section or a panel specification with random bilateral effects (fixed effects eliminating agreements that are time invariant). In this setting, one has to check for the potential correlation of some explanatory variables with the countrypair unobservable effects. I show that the use of the instrumental variable method proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) is necessary to avoid estimation bias.
Moreover, the selection bias that can appear in an unbalanced sample is tested and corrected for by the inclusion of a selection rule in the model's estimation (e.g. Nijman and Verbeek, 1992 or Guillotin and Sevestre, 1994) .
Section 2 presents the canonical gravity model (with the barrier-to-trade function) and the modified cross-section version used for ex-post evaluations of RTAs (with the three dummies mentioned above that have to be included for each RTA). Section 3 specifies the alternative panel model with the characteristics proposed above (bilateral random effects, and correction for the endogenous explanatory variables and for the selection bias). Finally, section 4 presents the average effects of each RTA over 1962 RTA over -1996 and the evolution of these effects over the same period, comparing cross-section and panel estimates. To anticipate the main conclusion, it turns out that the panel estimates yield more convincing estimations in the average effects (as RTA dummies do not capture anymore unobservable bilateral trade patterns) as in the evolution which suggest that, globally, around the date of implementation, RTAs generated larger increases in trade among members than predicted with cross-section estimates.
Insofar as the gravity model is the accepted model for estimating the efficiency effects of RTAs, attention should be paid to the proper specification of the model. Section 5 concludes.
THE GRAVITY MODEL AS AN EX-POST METHOD TO ASSESS REGIONAL AGREEMENTS

The canonical gravity model
Following the recent exposition in Baier and Bergstrand (2002) , I use a generalized version of the "standard" gravity model derived from a framework where firms maximize profits and consumers maximize utility according to Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. As shown by Baier and Bergstrand (2002) , if the representative profitmaximizing firms in country j set product prices delivered to market i according to equation (2), one obtains the following equilibrium trade flow for each goodsproducing firm in country j to market i: 
with ij θ a barrier-to-trade function between i and j to be developed below;
P i : output-weighted measure of the remoteness (in terms of trade costs) of country i
with n j being the number of varieties of goods produced in j;
t ij : ad valorem tariff rate by country i on the good produced in j (t ii =0 assumed); ( )
where Y w is world output of goods and P i * and P j * can be interpreted as "multilateral price resistance terms" (see e.g. Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) .
Equation (4) is remarkably close to the gravity model in empirical literature. It
suggests that the proper specification should include:
(1) the logarithm of the product of the GDPs of countries i (Y i ) and j (Y j );
(2) per capita GDP or population of the exporting country, N j , as a proxy for the capital-endowment ratio (which determines the endogenous share of goods in national output i.e. s j ) 2 .
(3) a proxy for the term θ ij . It is obvious that it is crucial to get the best handle possible on what constitutes the "barriers-to-trade'' function, which is usually proxied either by distance, D ij , between trading partners (and the presence of a common border and a common language as for instance in Bergstrand, 2002 or Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) , or sometimes by the c.i.f/f.o.b price ratio 3 . Because recent studies have shown that these variables are not the only determinants of barriers to trade, I model the barrier-to-trade function, between countries i and j, as follows 4 :
with (expected signs on coefficients in parentheses):
2 Populations (or alternatively per capita incomes) now have a straightforward interpretation in the gravity equation: higher populations (for given incomes) reduce the capital-labor endowment ratios of the exporter countries, tending to reduce the capital-intensive industry's share of national output. Then, merchandise trade flow (the dependent variable) should fall, relative to national output, as goods are capital intensive (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2002) . 3 Baier and Bergstrand (2001) use the c.i.f/f.o.b ratio to model transport costs, but their study only deals with OECD countries which have better data. For a discussion about the problems associated with the use of c.i.f/f.o.b data see Hummels (1999) and Limao and Venables (2001) . (4) the product of the multilateral resistance term for the country pair. As discussed in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) , proper estimation of P i * and P j * requires a nonlinear estimation technique 5 . We use the following multilateral resistance or "remoteness" proxies 6 :
( )
where (6a) and (6b) are estimated using a central elasticity value σ=4 (results in the paper are robust to 2<σ<6).
Taking into account the modifications discussed above, after substitution of (5) 
where w A Y is absorbed in the constant term, and with the expected signs:
4 e.g. Limao and Venables (2001) . 5 Measures of multilateral resistance (cf. Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003) or fixed effects (cf. Rose and Van Wincoop 2001 and Feenstra 2003) must be included to avoid an omitted variables bias. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2003) show that both approaches yield consistent estimates in a gravity equation.
6 Polak (1996) shows that if one doesn't use a measure of the average distance between a country and its main partners as well as absolute distance in assessing the effects of RTAs, one will underestimate trade between faraway countries and thus bias the RTA coefficient. As shown in the recent derivations of the gravity model, one should include the average distance of the importing country i from its main partners.
The gravity model for ex-post assessment of regional trade agreements
Initially used by Aitken (1973) as an ex-post assessment for the EEC, the gravity model seems well defined for this issue for two reasons. Firstly, arguably, the model represents a relevant counterfactual to isolate the effects of an RTA. If the sample of countries is appropriately selected, the gravity equation then suggests a "normal" level of bilateral trade for the sample. Then, dummy variables can be used to capture the "atypical" levels resulting from an RTA. Secondly, thanks to the correct introduction of dummy variables in the model, one can isolate trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD) effects of an RTA.
In a Vinerian world following a RTA, TC and TD will be reflected in trade flows as follows :(i) under pure TC, intra-regional trade increases and imports from the rest of the world (ROW) remain unchanged; (ii) under pure TD, the increase in intra-regional trade is entirely offset by a corresponding decrease in imports from the ROW; (iii) if there is both TC and TD, intra-regional trade increases more than imports from the ROW decrease. Because of second-best considerations, identification of TD and TC does not allow inference about the welfare consequences of a RTA for its members.
Finally, for non-members, one should include a measure of the change in volume of exports from members to non-members (an increase signifying an improvement in welfare for non-members) 7 .
Therefore, the correct ex-post assessment (e.g. Endoh (1999) and Soloaga and Winters Suppose that α I >0, which corresponds to more intra-bloc trade than predicted by the reference (α I <0 corresponding to a RTA between complementary economies) and which can be in substitution to domestic production or to exports from the ROW.
Hence, to conclude on whether this corresponds to TC or TD, one needs to examine the signs of the coefficients α M and α X . Then, α I >0 along with a lower propensity to import from the ROW (α M <0) indicates TD, and if the increase in intra-regional trade is entirely offset by a decrease in regional imports from the ROW, we have pure TD.
If intra-regional trade increases more than imports from the ROW decrease, there is both TC and TD. And with α I >0 and α M ≥0, there is pure TC. Finally, comparing α I and α X can lead to inferences about welfare for non-members. For example, (α I >0,α X <0) would indicate a dominant "export diversion" and hence a decrease in welfare for non-members.
To summarize, following a RTA, [α I >0 and α M ≥0 (α X ≥0)] indicates pure TC in terms of imports (exports) and [α I >0 and α M <0 (α X <0)], indicates TD in terms of imports (exports).
DATA AND ESTIMATION
The model is estimated with data for 130 countries over the period . Trade data are from UN COMTRADE (total bilateral imports in current dollars). Data sources for the explanatory variables along with data transformations are presented in appendix A.1. Once the missing values are taken out 9 , the sample covers 130 countries (a list of the countries in the sample is presented in appendix A.2). There are thus 240 691 observations for 14 387 pairs of countries.
Panel specification
It has been observed repeatedly (see Polak, 1996 , Matyas, 1997 , Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997 ) that regional dummy variables in cross-country estimates capture everything specific to the importing or exporting countries not captured by the variables included in the equation that influence the level of trade (e.g. historical, cultural, ethnic, political or geographical factors) 10 which is troublesome since the dummy variables should really isolate TD and TC effects. Not taking into account the countries' heterogeneity or of the pair of countries in bilateral trade relations may introduce a bias. By contrast, a panel data method enables one to identify the specific effects of the pair of countries and to isolate them. The usual correction introduces three specific effects: exporter, importer and time effects (e.g. Matyas, 1997 and Soloaga and Winters, 2001 ). But the model with three specific effects is only a restricted version of the more general model which allows for country-pair heterogeneity adopted here (e.g. Cheng and Wall, 1999 and Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2000) . Then a bilateral term, µ ij , specific to each pair of countries and common to each year (and different according to the direction of trade: µ ij ≠ µ ji ), is included in the previous model (7) 
α 0 : effect common to all years and pairs of countries (constant); α t : effect specific to year t but common to all the pairs of countries to capture common shocks (e.g. changes in oil prices);
µ ij : effect specific to each pair of countries and common to all the years.
Note the introduction of the bilateral real exchange rate (RER ijt ) in equation (8). In a model with panel data that span a long time period (here 35 years), it is essential to capture the evolution of competitiveness (e.g. Soloaga and Winters, 2001 and Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997 ). An increase in the bilateral real exchange rate reflecting a depreciation of the importing country's currency against that of the exporting country, one would expect β 12 <0.
Following the specification check, the three dummy variables discussed above are introduced in the model to detect TD and TC for a selection of RTAs.
Econometric method
The RTAs considered in the paper are: EU, ANDEAN, NAFTA, CACM, The usual way to deal with this issue is to consider instrumental variables estimation such as that proposed by Hausman and Taylor (henceforth HT) (1981), though here it is adapted to the case of an unbalanced sample according to the method proposed by Guillotin and Sevestre (1994) . Let X (Z) the matrix of explanatory variables variant (invariant) over time and suppose that among the variables X and Z, there exist: (i) X ijt: k 1 (k 2 ) exogenous (endogenous) variables, denoted X 1 (X 2 ) ;
(ii) Z ij: g 1 (g 2 ) exogenous (endogenous) variables denoted Z 1 (Z 2 ).
If the condition k 1 ≥ g 2 is satisfied, then the equation is identified and (8) The Hausman test (1978) allows us to control for the presence of correlation between explanatory variables and specific bilateral effects. 13 Q is the matrix that computes the deviations from individual means. P is the matrix that computes the observation across time for each individual (pair of countries). 14 as it does not correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation due to the presence of random bilateral specific effects. 15 with σ µ 2 and σ ν 2 corrected for the bias of heteroskedasticity specific to the unbalanced sample.
A Hausman test of over-identification, based on the comparison of the HT estimator and the Within estimator, must be carried out. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the instruments are legitimate (in the sense of no bias due to a correlation between specific bilateral effects and the explanatory variables), and the HT estimator is the most efficient estimator (e.g. Baltagi, 2001) . Note that canonical correlations are also a useful device for comparing different sets of instruments 17 . In fact, one should use instruments for which the geometric average of the canonical correlations with the regressors are maximized (e.g. Baltagi, 2001 , Mairesse et al., 1999 or Hall et al. 1996 .
Endogeneity of explanatory variables and sample selection bias
I check first for endogeneity among explanatory variables. 18 Results are reported in Within and GLS estimators, reveals a χ² 7 = 944.39, which is highly significant (1%).
Hence, this test rejects the null hypothesis according to which there would be no correlation between the bilateral specific effects and the explanatory variables. The GLS estimator is thus biased, and the use of the HT method is therefore justified.
For sensitivity analysis, five regressions are estimated with the HT estimator. The over-identification test indicates for each regression if the instruments are legitimate 16 The average value of Ω ij will be systematically presented in the tables of results.
17 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting using canonical correlations. 18 Because the dataset covers a long time span, some series may contain a unit root and thus the estimates in the table 1 may be spurious. So, a Levine and Lin (1993) unit root test has been applied to the series for GDP, population and bilateral import. This test rejects, for all series, the null of a unit root.
or if an additional source of correlation between specific effects and explanatory variables exists (in the case of a significant test statistic).
Insert Table 1 here
The first estimation, labeled HT I in Likewise, imports from a country without direct access to the sea are 36% lower.
Finally, a real depreciation of i with respect to j lowers i's imports from j. These results are sensible and overall, very comforting.
However, a last potential estimation bias deserves scrutiny: the unbalanced sample could be subject to a non-ignorable selection rule 25 . In this case, the selection bias can be tested and corrected by the inclusion of the selection rule in the model estimation. I use a method proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992) , which approximates the Heckman correction term by adding variables that reflect the individual's patterns in terms of presence in the sample to the model (see Guillotin and Sevestre, 1994) . So
HT IV is estimated again including the following additional variables: (i) PRES:
number of years of presence of the couple ij's in the sample;(ii) DD: dummy that takes 22 One can use a linear projection to instrument for endogenous binary variables as mentioned in Wooldridge (2000, p.84) . 23 According to the Barghava and al. Durbin Watson test (1982) , modified to the unbalanced panel, the HT IV and HT V residuals are not autocorrelated AR(1): there is no systematic difference between observed and predicted trade flows. Hence, the HT estimator is efficient and the over-identification test is appropriate. 24 According to equation (8), β 6 =(1-σ).δ 1 . The elasticity of transport costs with respect to distance is usually estimated in the range 0.2<δ 1 <0.4 (e.g. Limao and Venables, 2001, Hummels, 1999) . Combined with an elasticity of substitution between goods of about 4 (Rose and Van Wincoop, 2001 , use an estimate of σ=5; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001 , suggest a consensus estimate of σ between 4 and 6), the implied distance coefficient would be in the range -0.8<β 6 <1.2 which is almost identical to the estimates of β 6 in table 1. 25 i.e. that the probability of a pair of countries being included in the sample is not independent of model error, and in particular to the unobserved bilateral effects.
the value 1 if ij is observed during the entire period, 0 otherwise;(iii) PA t : dummy that takes the value 1 if ij was present in t-1 (PA 0 =0).
Results from this estimation are reported in the first column of 
APPLICATION TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
I proceed in two steps: first I comment the average effects of each RTA over the entire sample period reported in table 2, then I decompose these average effects to look for the evolutions over the period (notably around the important dates). Table 2 reports the coefficients for dummy variables for two sets of regressions, one in cross-section (corresponding to most uses of the gravity model for ex-post assessments of RTAs), yielding 35 separate regressions (one for each year), the other with the panel specification of section 3.
Average effects over the period 1962-1996
Insert Table 2 here
Results are quite different depending on the estimation method. For instance, on average over 1962-1996, intra-EU trade is 104% (=100(e 0.713 -1) above what is predicted by the panel gravity model, whereas it is 21% below the expected level according to the cross-section gravity model. The latter negative result is obtained in other crosssection studies, i.e. Frankel (1997) or Soloaga and Winters (2001) . Likewise, in the panel estimation, the ANDEAN and the ASEAN blocs present a trade between members about respectively 1.2 and 2.4 times above the reference prediction, associated with a propensity to import from the ROW inferior by 62% and 38%. By contrast, in the cross-section estimations, the positive intra-trade for these two RTAs is associated, on average, with a positive propensity to import from the ROW.
Since relevant inferences about TD and TC require inspection of the evolution of these coefficients over time and around the period when RTAs are implemented, I break down regional dummy variables into two-year periods with these variables replacing the global regional dummies. 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
For the EU, the sample period did not allow the inclusion of a pre-RTA period. This is not the case for the other RTAs. Comparing the results from both estimation methods is even more striking in the cases of MERCOSUR and NAFTA. Here, the crosssection estimates show largely unexplainable volatility throughout the time-period whereas the panel estimates capture much more clearly the expected effects of a RTA around the time of announcement or of implementation: an increase in intra-trade and a decrease in imports from the ROW. The difference in patterns is particularly striking for NAFTA, which reveals largely insignificant dummies until the first trade policy reforms in Mexico, and the announcement of NAFTA negotiations. As to MERCOSUR, panel estimates capture both the increase in intra-trade and the diversion of import from the ROW captured in the more disaggregated analysis in Yeats (1998) . At the same time, there is some evidence of an increase of exports for NAFTA and MERCOSUR to the ROW (which probably reflects reduction in trade barriers to non-partners at the same time as they were forming the RTA). Clearly, the panel estimates reveal a more plausible pattern than the cross-section estimates, and yield plausible patterns, which is not the case for the cross-section estimates.
This pattern of import (and sometimes export) TD was also found for other RTAs reported in appendix A.3. For example, in the case of the ANDEAN agreement, the model finds import-TD over the period 1969-1981, over the period 1962-1974 for the CACM, and over the period 1968-1980 for the LAIA. Concurrently, over the same period, an export-TD is observed for the ANDEAN, whereas there is some evidence of an increase of the propensity to export towards the ROW for CACM. ASEAN and LAIA (after 1980) are the only examples of pure TC over the period.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has paid particular attention to the specification and the estimation of the gravity model to correct for biases present in previous studies. The panel estimation with bilateral specific random effects was revealed to be statistically justified after correcting for the endogeneity of the income, size, infrastructure and intra-RTA trade variables. Moreover, dummies were introduced to take into account the selection rule of the sample. Arguably, these modifications lead to a better formulation of the counterfactual against which one assesses the trade performance of RTAs.
Comparison of panel estimates with the more usual cross-section estimates revealed a far more plausible pattern of trade effects associated with RTAs as evidenced by the examination of three well-studied RTAs: EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA. In general, the findings of this study, covering seven RTAs, show that most of these RTAs resulted in an increase in intra-regional trade beyond levels predicted by the gravity model, often coupled with a reduction in imports from the rest of the world, and at times coupled with a reduction in exports to the rest of the world, suggesting evidence of trade diversion.
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Canonical correlation j) --0.81 0.62 0.76 0.70 0.75 ** and * significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively (t-student is presented under the correspondent coefficient). The time dummy variables and the constant are not reported in order to save space. a) HT I : endogenous variables = lnY it and lnY jt . This test is applied to the differences between the Within and GLS estimators, without taking into account the coefficients of time effects. If we take them into account, the result is: chi-2(48)= 1373.65** h) Hausman test applied to the differences between GLS and HT estimators, without time effects. i) Hausman test applied to the differences between Within and HT estimators, without time effects. j) Geometric average of the canonical correlation coefficients. ** and * significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively (t-student is presented under the correspondent coefficient). a) As all the members of ANDEAN and MERCOSUR belong also to LAIA, we isolate the evolution of trade of the two former RTA in computing the dummies for LAIA as follows (i.e. Soloaga and Winters, 2001 
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